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BEYOND OUR CONCEPTION: A LOOK AT CHILDREN
BORN POSTHUMOUSLY THROUGH REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND NEW YORK INTESTACY LAW
BY ERICA HOWARD-POTTER*

HYPOTHETICALLY SPEAKING'

Mr. and Mrs. Gamete2 were married about a month before
Mr. Gamete was to be deployed to Afghanistan to fight the War on
Terror. He had been in the armed forces for quite a while, was
highly specialized in biochemical warfare, and was being deployed
specifically because of his expertise in that area. Knowing there
was a substantial risk that he would come into contact with
biochemical weapons, and that such risk could render him infertile,
he and his wife decided that he should deposit sperm at a sperm
bank to be frozen, just in case that did occur, so that they could still
conceive a biological child. Mr. Gamete deposited his sperm, and
left for Afghanistan shortly thereafter.
A few months later, Mrs. Gamete was diagnosed with
cancer, which required her to undergo chemotherapy and radiation
treatments. She, too, was fearful that these treatments would
render her infertile, so she decided to have her eggs harvested and
frozen. She went to the facility where her husband's sperm was
frozen, underwent the procedure, and successfully had her eggs
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Albany Law School. The author would like to thank

Professor Ira Bloom and Brendan Wolf for their guidance and counseling
throughout the research and writing process. Special thanks to my family,
especially my husband, for their unwavering love and support. Additional
thanks to Professor Nancy Hart, who made the public aware of this issue, and to
Professor Katheryn Katz for providing additional insight.
This hypothetical will be used throughout this paper to illustrate different legal
scenarios.
2A gamete is defined as "[a] reproductive cell having the haploid number of
chromosomes, especially a sperm or egg capable of fusing with a gamete of the
opposite
sex
to
produce
a
fertilized
egg,"
available at
http://dictionarv.reference.com/search?q=gamete (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
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extracted and frozen. The following day, she began the cancer
treatment.
Suppose Mr. Gamete is killed while he is at war. Should
Mrs. Gamete be able to use his frozen sperm to conceive a child
after his death?3 Conversely, suppose Mrs. Gamete loses her battle
with cancer. Should Mr. Gamete be able to use a surrogate and his
wife's eggs to conceive a child after her death? 4 If the answer is
yes to these questions, then what result? In particular, will the
deceased husband or wife still be considered the father or mother
of the resulting children? Will the children be considered heirs of
the deceased parent for purposes of intestacy law? Should they be
able to? These are the questions that courts and state legislatures
are beginning to face in light of advances in assisted reproductive
technology.
INTRODUCTION

Individuals decide to freeze their gametes for a variety of
reasons. 5 One need not be married to deposit gametes at a facility
for preservation, and one need not deposit such gametes for his or
her own use.6 Gametes, when frozen, can be successfully used for

There are a number of Constitutional issues that are involved, such as an
individual's right to procreate or not to procreate, that are beyond the scope of
this paper. See Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the Grave: An Analysis of
Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531-47 (1993), for a
detailed discussion of the Constitutional issues raised by posthumous
3

conception.

4 Although it is more difficult for eggs to be successfully frozen for a long

period of time, it is possible to freeze them at least for a period of time. See
Michael Elliott, Tales of ParenthoodFrom the Crypt: The Predicament of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 48 (2004).
5 See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father'sLast Will,
46 ARIZ. L. REv. 91, 91 (2004) (illustrating why men being deployed for war
deposit sperm at sperm banks); Elliott, supra note 4, at 48 (explaining that men
deposit sperm at sperm banks "for reasons of 'insurance' against illness or
accident").
6 For example, many men deposit sperm on an anonymous basis, waiving all
parental rights, to be used by another couple. See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 527.
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many years,7 which may be both a blessing and a curse: a blessing
because that amount of time gives couples attempting to conceive
flexibility; a curse because that amount of time allows for
conception after the death of the husband or wife. The conception
itself is not the curse, rather, the lack of rights the resulting child
has in relation to the deceased parent becomes the curse.8
Specifically, when an individual who has frozen his or her gametes
dies without a will, and a child is subsequently conceived using
those gametes, that child's intestacy rights are unclear in all but a
few states.9 This lack of clarity has other implications for the child
as well."°
This comment will first discuss the different types of
assisted reproductive technologies, common law presumptions of
paternity and the law behind posthumous (or after-born) and nonmarital children. Next, this comment will look at the United States
cases that have dealt with the issue of posthumously conceived
children, followed by the approaches taken by the American Law
Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the American Bar Association and the few state
legislatures that have specifically dealt with this issue. A focus on
current New York law will follow, including the intestacy statute, a
section of the domestic relations law, the non-marital children
statute, case law and a look to policy recommendations made by a
New York State task force created specifically to discuss children

7 See, e.g., Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-ChildRelationship in an Age

of Reproductive Technology: Implicationsfor Inheritance,29 REAL PROP. PROB.

& TR. J. 55, 63 (1994) (discussing how cryopreserved embryos make it possible
"for a child to be born years, even decades, after the death of the genetic
parents."); Susan Lewis Cooper & Ellen Sarasohn Glazer, CHOOSING ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 153
(Perspectives Press, 1998) [hereinafter Cooper].
8 This "curse" can most likely be avoided by the use of a will. See discussion
of
wills infra Part XI.
9 See the various approaches taken by other states infra Part IX.
10 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a) (1) (1998), a regulation promulgated
pursuant to the Social Security Act, stating that a child "may be eligible for
benefits [if he or she] ... could inherit the insured's person property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws."
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born as a result of assisted reproductive technology."
Additionally, current proposed legislation in New York concerning
after-born children and children of assisted reproduction will be
discussed. There will then be a brief discussion about wills,
detailing the difference between posthumously conceived
children's rights under a will versus under intestacy law. Finally,
there will be some proposals and suggestions made to the New
York State Legislature on how New York should handle this issue.
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

(ART)

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

Artificial insemination ("Al") is the oldest12 and most
common form 3 of assisted reproduction employed. It is typically
used to treat male infertility, but also may be "used to combat
[other] "male reproductive problems."14 To perform Al, sperm is
placed "in the woman's vagina, cervix or uterus."15 More often
than not, sperm is placed in the cervix or uterus (rather than the
vagina) in an effort to bring the sperm "closer to its ultimate
destination," the egg.' 6
There are two types of Al: AID and AIH. AID involves
insemination using the sperm of a (typically anonymous) donor. 7
AIH involves insemination using the husband's sperm. Either
procedure may be performed with "fresh semen or semen that has

"See Task Force infra Part X (d).
12

See Cooper, supra note 7, at 153.

The procedure was first used to breed

horses in the fourteenth century, and in 1799 the first "birth of a human
conceived by artificial insemination (with the husband's sperm) was recorded."
13Id at 154 (stating that artificial insemination "has been widely available
since
the early 1980s and is now employed much more frequently than" other assisted
reproduction methods).
14 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 58.
'5Cooper, supra note 7, at 153.
16

17

id.

McAllister, supra note 7, at 59. AID and other forms of assisted reproductive

technologies may also be used by same-sex couples, as these couples are
incapable of having a child that is biologically related to both of them.
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been thawed after long-term frozen storage." 18 If a husband is
"azoospermic"--infertile with no sperm at all-AID is the only Al
option. 9 This method enables a couple to have a child, but only
the mother will be a biological parent. AIH is usually used when a
husband is "oligospermic"-infertile but with "some sperm"--and
2
conceiving through sexual intercourse "is highly improbable., 1
With this method, a couple is given the opportunity to have a
biological child when it may not have been otherwise possible.
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

The steps involved in in vitro fertilization ("IVF") are as
follows. First, a woman takes "ovulation inducing drugs" in order
to produce multiple "oocytes" (eggs). 21 Next, the eggs are
harvested from the ovaries and placed into a petri dish where they
are combined with 50,000 pre-selected "motile" sperm.22 Then,
once (if) fertilization occurs, the resulting embryos are transferred
to the uterus. 23 The age of the woman will determine how many
embryos are transferred.24
Eggs, like sperm, may also be donated and used when a
woman cannot produce viable eggs but is capable of being
pregnant and carrying a child to term.25 This is analogous to AID,
when a couple uses the sperm of an anonymous donor, enabling a
couple to have a child where only one parent is the biological
parent. Conversely, when a woman is capable of producing viable
eggs but incapable of being pregnant, her eggs may be fertilized

18id.
19Cooper, supra note 7, at 155.
20 id.
21
Id.at 40.
22

Id.

Motile is defined as "[m]oving or having the power to move

spontaneously," available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=motile
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
23Cooper, supra note 7, at 40-41.
24 Id. at 41. Typically, three embryos are transferred to "women
under age 35,
four embryos in women 35 to 40 and as many as five or six embryos in women
over forty."
25 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 61-62.
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and transferred to a surrogate's uterus, allowing a couple to have a
biological child.26
CRYOPRESERVATION

Cryopreservation is essentially a branch of IVF.2 7 After the
eggs have been fertilized and the embryos have been transferred,
there may be excess embryos that couples freeze for later use.28
Cryopreservation has many advantages, such as: allowing embryos
to be transferred more than once, if the first attempt is unsuccessful
or if a couple wants more than one child; permitting a woman to be
implanted "during a natural cycle rather than during a drugstimulated cycle.., because drug stimulation makes the uterus less
receptive to implantation"; and it may reduce the occurrence of
multiple pregnancies.29 Once the embryos are thawed, they are
transferred to the uterus using IVF. 3 °
GAMETE INTRAFALLOPIAN TRANSFER

Gamete intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT") is another
variation of IVF. 3 1 But, instead of combining the eggs and sperm
in a petri dish, the retrieved eggs are placed "directly into the
fallopian tubes with large numbers of sperm. ' 32
Because
fertilization occurs naturally in the fallopian tubes and it is
assumed that the tube is "better incubator than a Petri dish," GIFT
is more advantageous than other forms of IVF.33 Any extra eggs
26

Id.at 62.

27

See Cooper, supra note 7, at 41.

28

Id.

In order to achieve cryopreservation, embryos are cooled and

dehydrated-the embryos are "suspended in an aqueous medium and chemically
treated with a cryoprotectant [which] replaces the water in the cells." A gradual
method is used to cool the embryo "to -80 degrees C, then is transferred to liquid
nitrogen where it rapidly cools to -196 degrees C for long-term storage."
McAllister, supra note 7, at 62-63.
29

See McAllister, supra note 7, at 62.

3

0Id.at 63.

31id
32

Cooper, supra note 7, at 4 1.

33id.
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are not discarded, but are "inseminated and cryopreserved for later
use."3 4 There are a number of other variations of IVF and GIFT.35
PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTIONS OF
PATERNITY AND MATERNITY

Before the creation of blood tests that could establish a
biological relationship between two individuals, the common law
devised legal presumptions to establish such relationships. The
two presumptions that are relevant to this paper are those that
established parentage.
PATERNITY

In the early nineteenth century, the presumption of
paternity that had been in use was finally committed to writing.36
The King v. Luffe set out the already-accepted rule that "a child
born to the wife of a married man is his child, unless evidence
showed that he could not have been the father due to lack of access
to wife throughout relevant period of gestation or that he was
sterile or impotent."37 This presumption has been codified with
slight variations by many states, 38 and the statutes have been
deemed constitutional by the United States Supreme Court.3 9
34 id.

35 For example, Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer ("ZIFT") is when eggs are
fertilized in a petri dish, like IVF, but are transferred to the fallopian tube, like
with GIFT; Embryo Lavage and Transfer is when a woman egg-donor, instead
of having the eggs removed to be fertilized as with IVF, is instead artificially
inseminated with the husband's sperm and then the fertilized egg, if retrieved, is
to the uterus of the recipient." McAllister, supra note 7, at 63-65.
"transferred
36
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
2.5, Statutory Note, cmt. 3c, (citing The King v. Luffe, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B.
1807)).
37
id.

38 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-5; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209; CAL. FAM. CODE §§

7540, 7541, 7611; COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
804; D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-318; HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-4; 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/7; IOWA CODE § 252A.3(4); KY. REV. STAT.. § 406.011; LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 184; MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206; MICH. COMP.

LAWS § 700.2114; MINN. STAT. § 257.55; Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.822; MONT.
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MATERNITY

Before the use of ARTs, the idea that someone other than
the woman who gave birth to a child could be the child's mother
was inconceivable, as illustrated by "the ancient dictum mater est
quam [gestation] demonstrate (by gestation the mother is
demonstrated). 40
In other words, this belief created the
presumption that the gestational mother, the woman who gave
birth to the child, was automatically the mother of the child. This
presumption is rarely discussed-a woman has always been
capable of being impregnated by someone other than her husband,
but a woman has not always been capable of giving birth to a child
that is not biologically related to her.4
Where these presumptions become problematic is when
ARTs are involved. If the ART used is Al, then the presumption
can be useful-whether the Al is accomplished by AID or AIH,
the woman's husband is automatically the father, which is not
problematic. But, when IVF and a surrogate are used, these
presumptions create a number of problems. When a wife's eggs
are extracted and combined with her husband's sperm in a petri
dish, then implanted into a surrogate's uterus (in the situation
where a woman can produce viable eggs but is unable to carry a
pregnancy to term), these presumptions create a horrendous result.
First, the surrogate, as the gestational mother, will be the
CODE ANN. § 40-6-105; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.05 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1743; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5; N.Y. FAM CT. ACT § 532; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
29-17; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-7-04; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 2; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-3; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.002;
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040; WIS. STAT. § 891.41; and Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-2-102.
39 MichaelH. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
40

41

Johnson v. Calvert,851 P.2d 776, 781 (1993).
See, e.g., Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for

New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 187 n.1 (1986) (discussing
the fact that the maternity "presumption is not articulated as such in the legal
field, for the presumption has been so absolute as to have generated no
controversy." She goes on to say that "'We really have no definition of
'mother' in our lawbooks ... 'Mother' was believed to have been so basic that
no definition was deemed necessary."').
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presumptive mother. Second, and equally as disturbing, is that if
the surrogate is married, her husband will presumptively be the
father of the child. In that situation, the presumptions have the
effect of making a married couple the legal parents of a child that
is not biologically theirs without an adoption proceeding-the
42
biological parents' rights are thus severed against their will.

Consequently, the biological parents-the two people who decided
to use a surrogate for the sole purpose of enabling them to have a
biological child-are left with nothing.43
Even more problematic is when a child is conceived
posthumously. Particularly, if a husband had his sperm frozen
during his lifetime, and the widowed wife uses that sperm to
conceive a child after his death, then the child presumptively has
no legal father. Biologically, of course, the deceased husband is
the father of the child. But legally, since death ends marriage, the
woman is no longer married, so there is no husband to
presumptively be the father." This problem is compounded when
lVF and a surrogate become involved, as exemplified by the
following scenario. Suppose the hypothetical Mr. and Mrs.
Gamete both die, but their parents are aware that each of them had
gametes that were deposited, frozen and preserved. The parents
decide that they want a grandchild, created from the frozen sperm
and eggs of the now-deceased Mr. and Mrs. Gamete, and arrange
to have the sperm and eggs thawed and combined in a petri dish.
42

The reality of this situation can be illustrated by looking at VA. CODE ANN. §

20-158 (2004). According to the Virginia statute, when a surrogacy contract has
not been court-approved, and "if(i) the surrogate is married, (ii) her husband is a
party to the surrogacy contract, and (iii) the surrogate exercises her right to
retain custody and parental rights to the resulting child pursuant to § 20-162,
then the surrogate and her husband are the parents." Id.This result would occur
even if "either of the intended parents is a genetic parent of the resulting child."
Id.
43 For discussions on intent as a means to establish parentage, See Stumpf, supra
note 41; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297
(1990); John Lawrence Hill, Wat Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims
of Biology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991).
44 This is, of course assuming the mother had not remarried, like the women
involved in the case law surrounding this issue. See infra Part VI.
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They also arrange for the resulting embryos to be implanted into a
surrogate.45 If a child is bom, who are the parents? It would be
presumed that the surrogate mother would definitely be the mother,
and her husband, if she has one, would be the father. The
biological grandparents would certainly not be the parents, even
though their intent was not to donate the embryos to the surrogate,
but to have the surrogate give birth to the child/children. Clearly,
this situation would get complicated very quickly.
Of course, these presumptions are just that: legally created
presumptions which may be overcome. Fortunately, the advances
in technology that have brought about ARTs have also brought
about DNA and other blood testing that can easily prove biological
parentage. Although possible, overcoming these presumptions
often comes with heavy financial and emotional costs. 46
POSTHUMOUS (OR AFTER-BORN) AND NON-MARITAL
CHILDREN47

Posthumously conceived children have factors in common
with both posthumous (or after-born) and non-marital children.
For this reason, a brief look at the issues surrounding posthumous
(or after-born) and non-marital children, specifically how these

Although this would be an unusual situation, it is possible. For example,
under CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005), if a parent of the decedent was
4'

designated in the decedent's written specification as someone who could "use
the genetic material for posthumous conception," the decedent's parent could
most likely use the material in this manner.
46 See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d 776. In this case, a court battle was waged to
determine maternity of a three year old child born as the result of an embryo
created from a husband's and his wife's eggs implanted into a surrogate. When
relations between the married couple and the surrogate soured during the
surrogate's pregnancy, the surrogate tried to rescind on the contract between her
and the couple. The married couple retained custody of the child throughout the
litigation, but the surrogate was awarded visitation rights. The financial and
emotional costs that may be incurred by all parties involved in this type of
litigation are clearly demonstrated by the facts of this case.
47 The modem term for children who are born out of wedlock is "non-marital."
Previously, and in most of the cases cited in this section, these children were
referred to as being "illegitimate."
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children are treated under the law, is necessary in understanding
how posthumously conceived children will potentially be treated.
POSTHUMOUS (AFTER-BORN) CHILDREN
For hundreds of years it has been recognized that a child
who is "in ventre sa mere"48 at the death of his or her father will be
treated as "inesse"4 9 so long as the child is later born alive.5" Such
children are referred to as being posthumous or after-born. 51 The
traditional rule regarding posthumous children in terms of property
law is "that an infant in ventre sa mere," and later born alive,
"takes by descent," and thus is treated as though it was in being at
the time of the decedent's death.52
The obvious similarity between posthumous and
posthumously conceived children is the fact that in both situations
the children are born after the death of a parent. Of course, there is
a major difference as well: there is only a finite time in which
posthumous children can possibly be born after the death of a
parent, whereas posthumously conceived children can, as
previously discussed, be born many years after the death of a
parent. Because of this, creating a legal fiction (i.e., that a child in
gestation and later born alive will be treated as living at the time of
the parent's death) for posthumous children is relatively simple,
This phrase is Latin for "in gestation."
"In esse" is defined as: "In actual existence; in being." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 346 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Black's].
50 See Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, (NY Ch 1830) (citing Doe v.

48

49

Clarke, 2 Hen Black. R. 399 ("a posthumous child of C was held entitled" to
take under the devise "to every child of C"); and Miller v. Turner, 1 Ves. Sen.
85 ("a posthumous child was entitled, under a provision in the marriage articles
for every child who should be living at the death of the father.").
51 An after-born child is defined as: "A child born after execution of a will or
after the time in which a class gift closes. Black's, supra note 49, at 97. An
after-born heir is "[o]ne born after the death of an intestate from whom the heir
is entitled to inherit." Id. at 319.
52 Marsellis, 2 Paige Ch. (citing 3 Wilson's R. 526).
See also id., stating that
"[t]o enable the child after its birth to reap the benefit of these principles, it is
necessary it should be born perfectly alive" (citing 5. T. R. 64, Grose, J.,
quotation made in Doe ex dem. Lancashirev. Lancashire).
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and does not unduly burden the administration of estates. This
legal fiction does not work well when posthumously conceived
children are involved because estates could be held open almost
indefinitely waiting to see if a child will or will not be conceived
and born alive.
NON-MARITAL CHILDREN

According to the Supreme Court of the United States,
statutes that discriminate against non-marital children are subject
to a heightened scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.53 This is so
because "visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express
society's disapproval of the parents' liaisons is illogical and
unjust."54 The Court has also stated that the "[d]ifficulties of
proving paternity in some situations do not justify the total
statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die
intestate."55 However, the Court has often deemed intestacy
statutes that discriminate against non-marital children to be
Constitutional, since "[t]he more serious problem of proving
paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate
children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required
either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers'
estates or for legitimate children generally."56
53 See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (stating that although

"classifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they
nevertheless are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not

substantially related to permissible state interests.").
54 Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
55 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1976).
56

Id. at 770. The Supreme Court has applied this more demanding standard to

uphold a number of state statutes that discriminate against non-marital children.
See, e.g., Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261, 275-76 (holding that a New York statute

"which requires illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers by
intestate succession to provide a particular form of proof of paternity" that
legitimate children are not required to prove to not be in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause); and Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537, 539-40 (1971)

(holding that a Louisiana statute where "[c]hildren born out of wedlock and who
are never acknowledged by their parents apparently have no right to take
property by intestate succession from their father's estate" and where "[i]n some
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"Because

death

ends

a

marriage,

...

posthumously

children"57

conceived
are also non-marital children, and could be
treated the same way legally as other non-marital children. First,
posthumously conceived children share some significant
characteristics with non-marital children.
For example,
discriminating against posthumously conceived children, like nonmarital children, would be "visiting condemnation upon the child
in order to express society's disapproval of the parents' 58 choice
regarding conception. In other words, neither non-marital nor
posthumously conceived children are responsible for the
circumstances surrounding their births, and penalizing these
children for such circumstances is unjust.5 9 Likewise, requiring a
posthumously conceived child to prove his or her paternity or
maternity, thus requiring a more demanding standard than nonposthumously conceived children, also seems like a legal
necessity.
CASE LAW

Over the last decade, there have been four cases dealing
with the issue of whether posthumously conceived children are
entitled to receive Social Security benefits.6 ° This issue is relevant
for purposes of intestacy law because, under the Social Security
Act, one of the only ways to qualify as a "natural child," is the
ability to "inherit the insured's personal property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws."'"

In looking to state

laws, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") will make a
instances, their father may not even bequeath property to them by will" also did
not violate either the Equal Protection or the Due Process clauses).
57 Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 266-67

(Mass. 2002).
58 Matthews, 427 U.S. at 505.
'9 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 (stating that "no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as an unjust way of deterring the parent.").
60

Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Hart v. Shalala

(E.D. La. 1994) (No. 94-3944); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257; and In re Kolacy,
753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. 2000).
6'

42 U.S.C. § 416 (e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (a).
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qualification decision based on how "State courts would.., decide
whether [he or she] could inherit a child's share of the insured's
personal property if the insured were to die without leaving a
will."62 Because of this requirement, courts have been faced with
the issue of whether a posthumously conceived child may be
considered an heir for state intestacy purposes.63
In all of the four cases where this issue arose, the husband
was suffering from cancer and deposited sperm at a sperm bank
prior to receiving medical treatments that could make him
infertile. 64 Each woman had gone through the whole SSA process,
only to be denied benefits.65 Ultimately, each child was deemed
eligible to receive Social Security benefits,66 but the methods used
and the reasoning applied by each court were substantially
different. Consequently, only the two state courts that dealt with
this issue actually decided whether posthumously conceived
children would be considered heirs for purposes of their respective
states' intestacy laws.

62

§ 404.355 (b) (1).

63

The rules regarding how much each family member is entitled under Social

Security is somewhat analogous to the rules for intestacy law. Specifically,
when a person dies intestate, there are only a finite number of assets, and a
specific amount of money that is available for distribution among surviving
spouses and children. Similarly, there is a "family maximum" under the Social
Security Act, and benefits to individuals may be reduced "[i]f the total benefits
to which all persons are entitled on one earnings record exceed a maximum
amount prescribed by law ...so that they do not exceed that maximum." 20
CFR § 404.403. Thus, if a posthumously conceived child is eligible to receive
an intestate share of a deceased parent's estate, he or she will reduce the
intestate share of others entitled to such shares; likewise, the more family
members there are in a family receiving survivor's benefits under the Social
Security Act, each individual's share may be reduced to accommodate all family
members.
64 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594; Hart, (No. 94-3944); Woodward, 760
N.E.2d at 260; and In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258.
65 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595; Hart, (No. 94-3944); Woodward,
760
N.E.2d at 261; and In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259.
66 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599 & n.8; Hart, (No. 94-3944);
Woodward,
760 N.E.2d at 272; and In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
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HART V. SHALALA

The first court in the United States to deal with this precise
issue was the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana in Hart v. Shalala in 1994.67 The child in question,

Judith Christine Hart, was conceived three months after her
father's death via GIFT.68 Judith was denied Social Security
benefits because she "did not qualify as her father's heir for
intestacy purposes under Louisiana law," and could not otherwise
"meet the requirements of the Social Security Act," even though
she was Mr. Hart's biological child.6 9 When the case finally
reached the District Court level, the Social Security Commissioner
"announced that survivor's benefits would be paid to Judith Hart
upon return of the case from the court to the Social Security
Administration."7 Therefore, the court never had to reach the
issue of whether posthumously conceived children would be
considered heirs for Louisiana intestacy purposes.7 1
IN RE KOLACY

Six years later, the Morris County Superior Court of New
Jersey was faced with that precise issue in In Re Kolacy. The facts
of this case are as follows: Mr. Kolacy was diagnosed with
leukemia, and deposited his sperm at a bank before starting the
chemotherapy treatments that would most likely make him
67

Hart,(No. 94-3944).
68 Gloria J. Banks, TraditionalConcepts and NontraditionalConceptions: Social
Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY.

L.A.
L. REv. 251, 251 (1999).
69
Id. at 252, 254-55.
70 Id. at 255-56.

See Statement of Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social

Security, Regarding the Status of the Judith Hart Court Case (March 11, 1996)
(returning the case back to Social Security for the "immediate payment of
benefits to Judith Hart." This decision was made because the case presented
"significant policy issues that were not contemplated when the Social Security
Act was passed ...[and] it would be inappropriate to deny benefit payments to"
her).
71In response to this case, Louisiana subsequently enacted legislation to
deal
with this issue. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
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sterile.72 Fourteen months later, he lost his battle with leukemia.73
A year after his death, Mariantonia Kolacy allowed her husband's
sperm to be released "to the Center for Reproductive Medicine and
Infertility at Cornell University Medical College in New York
City" so that "[a]n IVF fertilization procedure uniting the sperm of
William Kolacy and eggs taken from Mariantonia" could be
performed.74 As a result of the successful procedure, "the embryos
...
were transferred into the womb of Mariantonia [and] ...[t]win
girls, Amanda and Elyse, were born... more than eighteen months
after the death of' their father.75
After Mariantonia was denied Social Security benefits on
behalf of her daughters as dependents of William Kolacy, she
brought an action seeking a declaration that her daughters be given
the status of being William Kolacy's intestate heirs. 76 The court
reasoned that "[a]lthough the Legislature has not dealt with the"
exact issue involved in this case, "it has manifested a general intent
that the children of a decedent should be amply provided for with
respect to property passing from him or through him as the result
of a death. 7 7 Furthermore, the judge stated that in his view, "the
general intent should prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of
statutes," and therefore held that:
Given that general legislative intent, it seems to me
that once we establish, as we have in this case, that
a child is indeed the offspring of a decedent, we
should routinely grant that child the legal status of
being an heir of the decedent, unless doing so would
unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or
would cause serious problems in terms of the
orderly administration of estates.78

72

In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. 2000).

73Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76
77

78

Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1262.
In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. 2000).
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The court also held that since estates cannot be held open
indefinitely, it would be fair and reasonable "for a Legislature to
impose time limits and other situationally described limits on the
ability of after born children to take from or through a parent," or,
in the absence of such legislation, for a court do so." But, since
"there are no estate administrative problems involved" in the
present case, and since "there are no competing interests of other
persons who were alive at the time of William Kolacy's death
which would be unfairly frustrated by recognizing [the twins] as
his heirs," the exact time limits need not be delineated here.8"
Thus, in New Jersey, at least for now, posthumously conceived
children are considered heirs for intestacy purposes, subject to
some potential limitations.
WOODWARD V. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts was the next court to
face this issue in 2002 in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social
Security. The facts in Woodward are almost identical to those in
Kolacy.8 When Woodward's twins were denied Social Security
benefits, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, and that court certified the following
question for the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
"If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to
be withdrawn from the husband for the purpose of
artificially impregnating the wife, and the woman is
impregnated with that sperm after the man, her
husband, has died, will children resulting from such
pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of natural
children under Massachusetts' law of intestate
succession?"82

79 Id.

80 Id.

Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass.
2002).
81

82

id.
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In deciding how to answer the question, the court first
noted that "[t]he Massachusetts intestacy statute does not... limit[]
the class of posthumous children to those in utero at the time of the
decedent's death."83 The court also points out that "[b]ecause
death ends a marriage, . . . posthumously conceived children are
always nonmarital children."84
The only difference in the
treatment of marital and nonmarital children for purposes of the
state's intestacy law is that nonmarital children "must obtain a
judgment of paternity as a necessary prerequisite" to being
considered heirs because, prior to the death of the parent, "the
parentage of such children can be neither acknowledged nor
adjudicated." 85
The same would be true for posthumously
conceived children. Additionally, the court points out that since
the Massachusetts intestacy statute refers to "issue," which "in the
context of intestacy. . . means all lineal (genetic) descendants,"
whether they are marital or nonmarital descendents does not affect
their status as heirs.86 Descendents, in Massachusetts, are defined
as "persons who by
consanguinity trace their lineage to the
' 81
ancestor.
designated
After reviewing the intestacy statutes, the court then
"answer[s] the question as follows":
In certain limited circumstances, a child resulting
from posthumous reproduction may enjoy the
inheritance
rights
of "issue"
under the
Massachusetts intestacy statute.
These limited
circumstances exist where, as a threshold matter,
the surviving parent or the child's other legal
representative demonstrates a genetic relationship
between the child and the decedent. The survivor or
representative must then establish both that the
decedent affirmatively consented to posthumous
83

Id. at 262.
at 266-67.
Id. at 267.
86
1d. at 263.
87 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 263.
84d.
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conception and to the support of any resulting child.
Even where such circumstances exist, time
limitations may preclude commencing a claim for
succession rights on behalf of a posthumously
conceived child. 8
Although this court goes further than any other court
(before or since) has gone in setting out specific criteria for
determining when posthumously conceived children are able to
qualify as issue for purposes of intestacy law, there are still a
number of questions left unanswered. For example: How does one
go about establishing that the decedent "consented to posthumous
conception and to support of the resulting child?" Specifically,
would a written document be required? And, at what point will
"time limitations ... preclude commencing a claim for succession
rights?" None of these questions needed to be answered based on
the facts of this particular case, 9 but they could become
problematic in the future.
GILLETT-NETTING V. BARNHART

The final case to deal with this issue, and the only federal
court to rule on this issue, was the United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart in 2004. Again, the
facts were nearly identical to those in Woodward and Kolacy.90
Based on these facts, and on Arizona's intestate succession laws,

88

Id. at 259.

This is also the approach taken by the Restatement.

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5,

Statutory Note, cmt. 1 (1999) (stating that posthumously conceived children
must "be born within a reasonable time after decedent's death[,]

. . . in

circumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of the child's
right to inherit").
89 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d. at 260, 267 (stating that the District Court
judge "has
removed from our consideration the question whether the paternity judgment
obtained by the wife in this case was valid" and that it was also unnecessary to
"address the timeliness issue").
90 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,371 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2004).
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the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied
Social Security benefits to Gillett-Netting's twins. 9' The district
court's holding centered on its determination that the twins failed
to meet the Social Security Act's definition of child since they
could not inherit from Robert Netting under Arizona intestacy
laws. 92 Looking to Arizona's intestacy statute, the court focuses on
the plain language of the statutory phrase "persons who survive the
decedent," and declare that language to be "indicative that [heirs]
must be in existence at the time of the decedent's death" (with an
exception only for an after-born child who was in gestation at the
time of death).93 The court further states that the decedent's intent
is irrelevant. 94
Next, the court rejects Gillett-Netting's argument that since
the twins are considered legitimate under Arizona's legitimacy
statute, they qualify as dependents under the Social Security Act,
and are thus eligible for benefits. The dependency argument put
forth by Gillett-Netting was the Supreme Court's holding in
Mathews v. Lucas.95

In that case, the Court stated that, "[u]nless

the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is
legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal
property from the insured parent's estate under applicable state
intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of
the parent's death." 96 The district court says that because the
children do not meet the definition of "child" under the Social
Security Act, their status as dependents is irrelevant. 97
Finally, the court turns to the decisions in Woodward and
Kolacy, distinguishes them from the present case, and refuses to

9'Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970 (D. Ariz. 2002).
9

' Id.at 966.

93 Id.

94 Id.

U.S. 495 (1976).
Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (citing Mathews, 427 U.S. at 498-99)
(emphasis added).
97 Id. Although this particular issue is not related to the issue of whether
posthumously conceived children are considered heirs under intestacy law, it is
discussed here because this is how the Ninth Circuit made its decision on appeal.
95Mathews v. Lucas, 427
96

See infra text accompanying notes 100-101.
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follow either of them. 98 Since Woodward applied Massachusetts
intestacy law, which does not have an "after-born heir provision"
like the one in Arizona's statute, and since Kolacy applied New
Jersey law, neither of those cases were considered persuasive by
the district court. 99

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that since the
twins "are Netting's legitimate children, they are considered to
have been dependent under the Act and are entitled to benefits."' 00
However, the court never answers the question of whether
posthumously conceived children would be considered heirs for
intestacy purposes in Arizona. In fact, the court makes it clear that
"[b]ecause [the twins] are Netting's children under Arizona state
law, we need not consider whether they could be deemed
dependent for another reason, such as their ability to inherit
property from their deceased father under Arizona intestacy
laws."' 1 Based on this decision, the issue of posthumously
conceived children is still unanswered in Arizona.'0 2
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE APPROACH
THE RESTATEMENT

Originally, the American Law Institute ("ALI") adopted
"the traditional view" that, in order to qualify as an heir, the child
must have been both conceived and born prior to the death of the

98

Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967-69.

99 Id. The court discusses additional issues, such as an equal protection claim,
but the rest of the opinion is not relevant for purposes of the present discussion.
o Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596.
101 Id. at 599 n.8.
102 On August 25, 2004, Betty Fletcher, the Social Security Commissioner, filed
a "petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc." Rhonda
Gillett-Netting's time to answer has been extended to November 8, 2004. See
Docket Summary, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at
http://pacer.ca9.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/reports.pl?CASENUM=0315442&puid=01099072.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). Fletcher's petition was
denied on Dec. 14, 2004. Id.
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decedent. 1°3 However, in light of the advancements in ARTs, the
ALI believes that "this proposition is open to reexamination."'
Specifically, the Restatement now "takes the position that, to
inherit from the decedent, a child produced from the genetic
material of the decedent by assisted reproductive technology must
be born within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in
circumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of
the child's right to inherit.""1 5 No definition or explanation is
given regarding what constitutes a "reasonable time" or what type
of proof would be sufficient to determine "that the decedent would
have approved of the child's right to inherit.""1 6 The only
clarification given is that a clear case would be when, after the
death of the husband, the decedent's widow used the husband's
frozen sperm to produce a child. 0 7 Conversely, if the spouses
''were in the process of divorcing when the decedent died," the
requisite approval would be doubtful.08 Other than those two
statements, no parameters are given. And, the Restatement does
not discuss the implications of frozen eggs or embryos, except to
say that "[s]imilar questions [concerning legal obligations and
relationships] could also arise regarding egg donors."109 Although
the ALI supports the idea of deeming posthumously conceived
children heirs, the rule it asserts is very vague and loose, and
would be difficult to adopt by any state because of its lack of
definite standards." 0

103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §

2.1, Statutory Note, cmt. d (1999).
104 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.5, cmt. 1(1999).
SId., at § 2.5, cmt. 1.
106 id.
107 Id.

108 Id.
110

But see supra, text accompanying note 88, the holding from Woodward v.

Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002), which is
very similar to the ALI approach.
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ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES

A few organizations have issued uniform laws and model
acts, or have at least taken a stance, regarding the rights and
responsibilities of the parties (donors, surrogates, parents and
children) involved in ART. The common thread among all of the
approaches that allow for posthumously conceived children to
qualify as heirs of their deceased parent is a written requirementunless an individual consents in writing to the use of his or her
gametes or embryos post-mortem, resulting children will never be
considered heirs.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM

STATE LAWS APPROACH
UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT

In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") first attempted to define the
rights of donors, surrogates, parents and children of assisted
reproductive technology through the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act ("USCACA")."'

The Act defines

"donor" as "an individual [other than a surrogate] who produces
egg or sperm used for assisted conception, whether or not a
payment is made for the egg or sperm used, but does not include a
woman who gives birth to a resulting child.""' 2 Section 4 of the
Act then states the rule that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception," and that "[a]n individual
who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is
conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using ' the
3
individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child."
The comment to this section explains that "[i]t is designed
primarily to avoid the problems of intestate succession which
could arise if the posthumous use of a person's genetic material
... UNIF.

STATUS

OF CHILDREN

[hereinafter USCACA].
,2USCACA § 1(2).
113 Id.at §4.

OF ASSISTED

CONCEPTION

ACT

(1988)
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could lead to the deceased being termed a parent.""' 4 The
USCACA is certainly clear regarding the intestacy rights of
posthumously conceived children, but the result is harshposthumously conceived children will never be considered heirs in
states that adopt this approach." 5
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT

Over a decade after issuing the USCACA, the NCCUSL
issued the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), and slightly revised its
attitude towards posthumously conceived children. The UPA
allows for the creation of a parent-child relationship between a
deceased individual and a posthumously conceived child, but only
in limited circumstances. In particular, section 707 states that
when "an individual ...consent[s] in a record to be a parent by

assisted reproduction," but then "dies before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos" the decedent will not be considered "a parent
of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse" agreed, in a
record, to be a parent of any child resulting from assisted
reproduction that "occur[s] after death."' 16 The UPA thus has two
major limitations: (1) a limit on the use of eggs, sperm and
embryos to the decedent's spouse; and (2) the consent to
posthumous conception "in a record."
The comment to this section explains that if the decedent's
eggs, sperm or embryos are used to either "conceiv[e] an embryo
or [to] implant[] an already existing embryo into a womb" when
such "consent in a record" is absent, this "ends the potential legal
parenthood of the deceased."'' As noted by the comment, this
section was "designed primarily to avoid the problems of intestate
succession that could arise if the posthumous use of a person's
114Id. at §4, cmt. The comment also states that "those who want to explicitly

provide for such children in their wills may do so." Id.
1'5See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04. North Dakota is the only state that has
adopted this approach.
l6 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2000) (last amended or revised 2002)
[hereinafter UPA]. See text accompanying notes 138-40, infra, discussing
which states have adopted this approach.
"' UPA §707, cmt. (comment updated Dec. 2002).
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genetic material leads to the deceased being determined to be a
parent.""' The NCCUSL approach here is a bit more concise and
less vague than the ALl approach (and more generous than the
USCACA), but it is still not entirely clear." 9 Significantly, the allimportant "consent in record" requirement is not defined, leaving
Again, this is not as
room for multiple interpretations.' 20
problematic as the Restatement, but there is still room for
improvement.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION APPROACH
MODEL ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ACT

In between the USCACA and the UPA, the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Committee on the Laws of Assisted
Reproductive Technologies and Genetics ("Committee") weighed
in on the issues surrounding ARTs with the Model Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Act (MARTA).' 2 ' Like the NCCUSL,
the ABA attempts to define the legal rights of donors, surrogates,
First, the Act distinguishes between
parents and children.
"donor[s]" and "intended parent(s)"-an intended parent is the

118

Id. Like the USCACA, the comment of this section goes on to state that a

person "who wants to explicitly provide for" posthumously conceived children
"in his or her will may do so." Id.
1"9Theoretically, a parent-child relationship could be established between the
deceased parent and the posthumously conceived child, but that child may still
not be eligible to take as an heir under intestacy law. See Robert J. Kerekes, My
Child ...
But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law, and Post-Mortem Conception,
31 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 221 (1996) (stating that "the posthumously
conceived child could establish paternity but be barred from intestate
inheritance").
120 For instance, it is not clear whether an actual will would be required, or if a
mere letter or other written statement would suffice.
121 Model Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act, American Bar Association,
Committee on the Laws of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics,
at
(Dec.
1999),
available
Discussion
Draft
(last visited
http://www.abanet.org/ftp/Rub/familv/modelassistedreptech.doc
Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Model Act].
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''
individual who "intend[s] to be legally bound as the parent. 2
Then, there are two sections in the Act dealing with posthumous
Transfer and Disposition"
use of embryos: "Section 1.05 ' Embryo
23
Inheritance."'
1.07
and "Section
Section 1.05, subsection (c), sets out the rule that written
embryo agreements must contain a provision providing the
following information: "(1) Intended parent(s) must agree, prior to
creating any embryos, whether an intended parent may use the
embryos in the event of a divorce, illness, or death of the other
intended parent.' 24 Subsection (c)(5) also provides that:

Following the death of one intended parent who has
previously consented to the posthumous use of
cryopreserved embryos, the surviving intended
parent may discard, donate or use the embryos for
their own parenting purposes. No child born more
than three years following the death of an intended
parent may be considered that individual's legal
child. 125
Assuming the parties have entered into a written embryo
agreement, this rule could be applied with little difficulty. This
rule only applies in situations where embryos are being used.
If the parties have not entered into a written embryo
agreement, or if frozen sperm or eggs are involved, then section
1.07, subdivision 1 applies the following rules:

122

Model Act, § 1.01(13). The definition of "donor" used is "an individual, not

an intended parent, who provides egg, sperm, or embryo used for assisted
conception." Id. at § 1.01 (8). "Intended parent(s)" is defined as "an individual
or couple, married or unmarried, who enter into a written or oral agreement with
a donor, or gestational carrier, under this Act providing that they intend to be
legally bound as the parent of a child or children born through assisted
conception." Id. at § 1.01 (13).
123 Model Act, §§ 1.05 & 1.07.
124 Model Act, § 1.05 (c) (1).
125 Model Act, § 1.05 (c) (5).
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Subd. 1. In the absence of a testamentary document
executed by an intended parent, the following
principles apply:
(a) If an intended parent dies before embryo
transfer, the resulting child has no rights against
the estate of that intended parent.
(b) If one or both intended parents die at any time
during the pregnancy of a gestational carrier, the
resulting child is an heir of both intended
parents.
(c) If an intended parent dies after storage of
gametes, or creation or storage of an embryo(s),
but before the time of transfer of gametes or
embryo(s), then the resulting child is not the heir
of the deceased intended parent.
(d) If one or both intended parents die after the
transfer of an embryo(s) or gametes, but before
child is the heir of
birth of the child, the resulting
26
both intended parents. 1

Again, this rule could be applied with little difficulty. But,
what is problematic about this rule concerning posthumously
conceived children is subsection (c)--most individuals who
deposit gametes do not have a written agreement, and this section
leaves posthumously conceived children with no intestacy rights in
relation to their deceased parent. Of course, this is a legitimate
approach, and is the same approach taken by the USCACA, but the
result is severe.
OTHER STATES' APPROACHES

Intestacy statutes vary from state-to-state. As a result,
posthumously conceived children in some states will be considered
heirs for purposes of the state's intestacy laws but children in other
states will not. In some states, this decision will not be clear. The
differences can be easily demonstrated by looking at existing

Model Act, § 1.07, subd. 1. "Testamentary document" is not defined, so it is
not clear whether it is a will or some other writing that is being referred to.
126
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statutes in Louisiana, 2 7 North Dakota,'28 California'29 and then

looking to the more traditional "conceived/begotten before,"' 30 in
gestation/mother's womb"''
and other statutes with similar
132
requirements.
LOUISIANA

Louisiana is one of the only states to have enacted specific
legislation that deals directly with posthumously conceived
children. Under the Louisiana statute, a posthumously conceived
child is "deemed the child of such decedent with all rights,
including the capacity to inherit from the decedent, as the child
would have had if the child had been in existence at the time" the
deceased parent died, subject to certain limitations. 3 3
The
limitations are as follows: the decedent must have "specifically
authorized in writing his surviving spouse to use his gametes," the
child must be "born to the surviving spouse, using the gametes of
the decedent," and the child must be born "within three years of
the death of the decedent.' ' 134 The statute also includes a provision
for the rights of any other "heir or legatee of the decedent whose
interest in the succession of the decedent will be reduced by the
birth of" a posthumously conceived child.'3 5
Clearly,
posthumously conceived children domiciled in Louisiana are
definitely considered heirs for purposes of intestacy law, so long as
they fit within the statute's limitations.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1.
1 N.D.CENT. CODE § 14-18-04.
129 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005).
130See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
127 LA.
28

See infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
133LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.1(A). This is similar to the Restatement. See
supra Part VII.
131

132

13

§ 391.1(A).

' § 391.1(B).
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CALIFORNIA

Although similar in effect to the Louisiana statute, the
California law has a slightly different approach. In determining
the child's property rights under the California statute, a
posthumously conceived child will be treated as though it had
"been born in the lifetime of the decedent," if all of the statutory
criteria are proved by "clear and convincing evidence."'' 3 6 Such
criteria includes: (a) a written instrument whereby the decedent
"specifies that his or her genetic material shall be used for the
posthumous conception of a child of the decedent"; (b) written
notice of the existence of the "decedent's genetic material" and its
availability "for the purpose of posthumous conception," via
certified mail, return receipt, is given to the person controlling the
"distribution of either the decedent's property or death benefits ...
within four months" of the decedent's death; and (c) the child must
be "in utero within two years of' the decedent's death, and the
"decedent's genetic material" must have been used.'37
Additionally, the "in writing" requirement of subsection (a) must
"be signed by the decedent and at least one competent witness,"
and any revocation or amendment
to the specification must be
138
manner.
same
the
in
done
The unique aspect of the California statute is the fact that it
allows not only the decedent's spouse "to use the genetic
material," but also allows the decedent's "registered domestic
partner" or any "other person named in the specification.' 39 In
other words, so long as the requirements of the written
specification have been met, the decedent's "genetic material" can
be used by anyone designated to do so in the specification. 4 '

136 CAL. PROB. CODE

§ 249.5.

137 Id.
138

§ 249.5.

§ 249.5 (a) (3). This statute treats the written specification similar to a will.
See discussion on wills, infra Part XI.
139
140

-
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UPA

In addition to intestacy laws, a number of states have also
adopted the UPA approach, 4 ' which establishes a parent-child
relationship when the "deceased spouse consented in a record that
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
spouse would be a parent of the child."' 142 Although the UPA
merely establishes a parent-child relationship, it may be inferred
would apply in the context
that this relationship, once 4established,
3
1
well.
as
of intestacy issues
NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota law is as clear as Louisiana's statute, but
comes to the exact opposite result. Pursuant to the North Dakota
statute, "[a] person who dies before a conception using that
person's sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child born of
the conception."'" Posthumously conceived children domiciled in
North Dakota would never be considered heirs for purposes of
intestacy law.
VARIATIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

Most state intestate statutes do not provide for
posthumously conceived children, only for after-born (or
posthumous) children. For example, many states (including New
York 45 ) require a child to be "conceived before ...but born
141See supra Part VIII (a) (ii).
142 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (8) (West 2005); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158 (B) (Michie 2005); and WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.730
(2005).
143See comment to U.P.A. § 707, stating that § 707 "is designed primarily to
avoid the problems of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous
use of a person's genetic material leads to the deceased being determined to be a
parent.".
144N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (2). This is also the approach of the USCACA.
See supra Part VIII(a)(i).
145See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(c) (McKinney 2005).
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thereafter" 146 or "begotten before ... but born thereafter" '47 the
death of the decedent in order to be considered an heir. Another
commonly used statutory requirement is that the child be "in
gestation" and then survive "one hundred twenty hours after its
birth,"'' 4 or be "in mother's womb"' 49 at the time of the decedent's
death and born later (these are essentially the same as the
conceived/begotten before requirement). Some states adopt a "ten
month" approach, meaning that if the child is born within ten
months of the intestate's death, it will be treated as though it had
"been born' 150 or "in being"' 5 ' at the time of decedent's death. On
the other hand, Missouri's statute states that heirs must be "born
in law to take as heirs at the time of the intestate's
and capable
152
death."
CURRENT NEW YORK LAW

New York State does not presently have any laws
pertaining to posthumously conceived children. An analysis of
146

See ALA. CODE § 43-8-47 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §28-9-210 (Michie

2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-108 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-108 (Michie
2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2-108 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS, § 3-107 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN.

3B:5-8; OR. REV. STAT. § 112.075 (2003); S. C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (Law
Co-op. 2004); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-1-2 (Michie 2005); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 31-2-108 (2005); WIS. STAT. 854.21 (2005); and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-103
(Michie 2005). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1 (2005) ("conceived prior to
decedent's death") and D.C. CODE ANN. §19-314 (2005) (child must be "in
being" at the time of decedent's death).
147 See IND. CODE § 29-1-2-6 (2005) and 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104 (West
2005). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2005) (child must be
"begotten before" decedent's death).
148 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (Michie 2005); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-2108
(2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS 700.2108
(2005); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-108 (2005); MONT. CODE ANN.72-2-118 (2005);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-108; and UTAH CODE ANN § 75-2-108 (2005). This is
also the approach of the Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108
(1974) (last revised 1990).
"' See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 310 (2005) and W. VA. CODE § 42-1-8 (2005).
50
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2005).
15 See KY. REV. STAT.§ 391.070 (Michie 2005).
152 Mo. REv. STAT.§ 474.050 (2005).
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current New York law, including statutes and case law involving
intestate succession and non-marital children, a Task Force's
recommendations for New York law, and current proposed
legislation reveals that New York would most likely be opposed to
allowing posthumously conceived children to take as heirs of their
deceased parent.
INTESTACY
STATUTE

New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("NY EPTL")
section 4-1.1 is New York's intestate statute. 153 According to
section 4-1.1, subsection (c): "Distributees of the decedent,
conceived before his or her death but born alive thereafter, take as
if they were born in his or her lifetime."' 54 The legislative history
for that section explains that normally, distributees of "intestate
property are determined as of the date of decedent's death."' 5 5
However, the history goes on to explain that when a distributee is
conceived prior to the death of the decedent, but after the
decedent's death is born alive, "the afterborn distribute will share
in the distribution just as if he or she were bom prior to decedent's
death."' 56 It is clear that in New York under this particular
provision, posthumously conceived children would not be
considered a distributee.' 57

153N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1. New York's intestate statute is
very similar to that of New Jersey's, and a Superior Court in New Jersey
interpreted the New Jersey statute to allow posthumously conceived children to
be considered heirs for intestacy purposes. See In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257
(N.J. Super. 2000).
114§ 4-1.1 (c) (emphasis added).
55NY Legislative History.
156
id.
157 The result would most likely be the same under a will provision that does not
specifically provide for posthumously conceived children. See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 2-1.3 and 6.5-7, in which posthumous children are
treated the same way for purposes of class gifts and future estate directions as
they are treated under intestacy law.
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CASE LAW

The approach of section 4-1.1(c) concerning the treatment
of posthumous children, even prior to codification of New York's
intestate statute, has been consistently followed in New York. As
early as 1830, courts in New York have held that a child who is
conceived but not yet born "is in esse for the purpose of taking the
remainder or any other estate or interest, which is for the benefit of
'
the infant."158
The only requirement for the unborn child is that it
be born alive, at which point the child will be entitled to the same
intestate rights as it would have been if it had been born at the time
of the decedent's death.' 59 The law is the same today as it was in
1830.
NON-MARITAL CHILDREN
STATUTE

As previously discussed, all posthumously conceived
children are also non-marital children; therefore it is important to
look at New York's approach to non-marital children. Under New
York's "inheritance for non-marital children" statute, NY EPTL §
4-1.2, a non-marital child is automatically allowed to inherit from
his or her mother, and no other requirements need to be met.16°
But, in order to inherit from the father, there are a number of
obstacles that need to be overcome. The simplest way to overcome
all of the obstacles is for the father, during his lifetime, to make
"an order of filiation declaring paternity" or to have both parents of
161
the child to "execute[] an acknowledgement of paternity."'
Otherwise, the second way in which a non-marital child will be
entitled to inherit from his or her father is for the father to sign "an
instrument acknowledging paternity," and such instrument must
meet three requirements. 162 First, the instrument must meet the
158

Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35 (1830).

159
160

id.
§ 4-1.2(a)(1).

161

§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(A).

162

§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(B).
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same requirements that are required in order "to entitle a deed to be
recorded," meaning that it must be signed in the presence of, and
acknowledged by, one or more witnesses before a notary public. 63
Next, the instrument must be filed with the putative father registry
within sixty days after it is made. ' 64 And finally, the mother must
receive written notification of the filing of the instrument from the
department of social services within seven days of the instrument
being filed. 165
A third way a non-marital child may inherit from his or her
father is if the father has "open and notoriously acknowledged the
child as his own," and this acknowledgement is "established by
clear and convincing evidence. ' 66 It should be noted that the
practice commentary to this section states that although such
evidence can be established theoretically in the case of a
posthumous child, "the likelihood of a decedent's acknowledging a
child still in utero is slim.'

167

This section, and its commentary,

has obvious implications for posthumously conceived children,
since clear and convincing evidence of acknowledgement is all but
68
impossible when a child is conceived after the death of a parent.'
The final way a non-marital child may establish paternity,
thus entitling the child to intestacy rights of his or her father, is
through the use of "a blood genetic marker test" in addition to
other "clear and convincing evidence" that also establishes
paternity. 69 As will be discussed in the next section on case law
surrounding non-marital children, the blood test must be performed
during the life of the father, and the deceased father's remains may
not be exhumed for the purposes of such testing."'7 Because of this

4-1.2(a)(2)(B)(i).

163

§

164

§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(B)(ii).

165

§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(B)(iii).

166

167

§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(C).
§ 4-1.2, Practice Commentaries, by Margaret Valentine Turano (McKinney's

2004).
168 Except, of course, if a will is used.
169 § 4-1.2(a)(2)(D).
"0 See Matter of Sekanic, 653 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3d Dept. 1997) and Matter of
Janis, 620 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dept. 1994).
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fact, posthumously conceived children could never use this section
to establish paternity.
The pertinent part of the statute concludes by stating that,
absent an order of filiation or an acknowledgment of paternity
being made, a child-support agreement (whereby the father agreed
to support the child) is insufficient to qualify a non-marital child as
an intestate heir. 7 ' What becomes clear when reading this statute
as a whole is that New York will allow a non-marital child to
receive a portion of his or her intestate father's estate in only a few
limited circumstances. It would be impossible for a posthumously
conceived child to meet these requirements.
CASE LAW

There have been a number of occasions on which New
York courts have had the opportunity to apply section 4-1.2, and
each time have taken a very narrow, literal approach to interpreting
the statute. For example, in two separate cases, non-marital
children were attempting to establish paternity in order to take an
intestate share of their fathers' estates. 7 2 In both of those cases,
the courts refused to retroactively apply amendments to the statute
that may have allowed the children to take an intestate share of
their father's estate, stating that "[i]t has been repeatedly held that
the rights of individuals who may have1 73an interest in a decedent's
death are fixed as of the date of death.
Even with the addition of the 1981 amendments, the date of
death will still most likely be the determining date for non-marital
children attempting to establish paternity for intestate purposes.
Specifically, the added sections pertain to the "blood genetic
marker test" and the "clear and convincing" establishment of
"open and notorious" acknowledgment requirements previously
discussed. 174 Of course, it is axiomatic that a parent would have to
171§
172

4-1.2(a)(3).
Matter of Gibbons, 566 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1991) and Matter

ofMalavase, 520 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dept. 1987).

1

Gibbons, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 511; Malavase, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 50.

amendment added sections (C) and (D) to subsection (a)(2) of § 4-1.2.
174See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.

The 1981
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openly acknowledge his or her child prior to his or her death,
which would be not be possible in the case of a posthumously
conceived child. Additionally, New York courts have consistently
held that any blood test must be administered during the life of the
decedent. 7 ' In two separate cases where non-marital children were
attempting to exhume the bodies of their deceased father's in order
to administer a blood test on tissue samples to be taken from the
exhumed bodies, the courts stated that "EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D),
phrased as it is in the past tense, clearly does not contemplate the
administration of such a test postmortem. ' The courts both go
on to say that 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) "should be construed in pari materia
with the Family Court Act § 519(c), which explicitly states that
such a test had to have been administered 'prior to [the putative
father's] death."

77

Additionally, one court even held that "even if

the statute did contemplate post-death testing, the request for
exhumation was unreasonable as a matter of law." 178 Thus, as
current law stands regarding non-marital children and intestacy
law, the date of death of the deceased parent is going to be the
determining date for qualifying as an intestate heir.
Difficult as it may be for non-marital children to establish
paternity, especially after the death of the father, imagine the
immense challenges a posthumously conceived child would face in
order to prevail under this statute.
Treating posthumously
conceived children for legal purposes as non-marital children
would make it all but impossible for them to take any intestate
share of their deceased parent's estate.

175See

Matter of Sekanic, 653 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3d Dept. 1997) and Matter of
Janis, 620 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dept. 1994).
176 Sekanic, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 451. The language of Janis is identical, but the
court uses the phrase "post death" instead of "postmortem." Janis, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 343.
177Sekanic, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (citing Janis, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 343).
78
1 Janis, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
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CHILDREN OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

STATUTE

As previously discussed, New York has codified the
"paternity presumption": a child borne to a married couple is
presumptively the child of the husband. 7 9 An expansion of this
presumption is found in New York Domestic Relation Law
("DRL") § 73.180 According to the DRL, when a husband and wife
consent in writing to the use of artificial insemination (specifically,
when the sperm being used is not his own), and the artificial
insemination is performed on the wife by a licensed physician, any
child born "shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child of the
husband and his wife for all purposes."' 8 ' The written consent
must be "executed and acknowledged by both the husband and
wife," and there must also be certification from the physician that
he or she performed and rendered the service. 82 This statute is an
attempt by the legislature to carry the paternal presumption into the
arena of AID. Currently, New York statutory law does not address
other types of ART.' 83
There is a possibility that, if the statutory requirements
were met, a posthumously conceived child could attempt to assert
his or her paternal rights using this statute to determine paternity.
But since two individuals cannot be married after the death of one
of the individuals, this would be a very difficult argument to
make.'84 Furthermore, this statute does not define the status of
children born through other forms of ART (whether such children
179 N.Y.FAM. CT. ACT § 532 (McKinney 2005).
180 N.Y.DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2005).
181 § 73.
182 § 73.
183 But see the Surrogate's Court Report, infra note 191, proposing legislation to

amend this statute to include other forms of ART.
184
This argument would be especially difficult in New York, as New York has a
policy of strictly construing written instruments post-mortem, and would most
likely not imply a testator's intent to allow for the establishment of paternity of a
posthumously conceived child. Even if paternity could be established, it does
not necessarily follow that the child would also be deemed an heir. See Elliott,
supra note 4, at 48.
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would be deemed legitimate or natural). This statute may be a
starting point for establishing the rights of posthumously conceived
children, but as currently written would not be sufficient.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW

In April 1998, the New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law 85 ("Task Force") released its recommendations regarding
what laws and policies New York State should adopt involving the
issues surrounding ARTs. 86 After looking to ethical, religious,
constitutional and health issues, the Task Force took the same
87
approach to posthumously conceived children as the USCACA:1
Posthumously conceived children are never to be considered
children of their deceased parent.' 8 The exact recommendation is
as follows: "New York law should provide that an individual who
dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is
conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the
' 89
individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.'
Although the NYSTFLL's recommendations are by no means
binding on the New York State Legislature or on New York State
courts, "[s]even of the Task Force's recommendations for
legislation or regulation have been enacted in New York State,"
including its recommendations on "surrogate parenting."' 90 This is
another indication that currently, New York would not allow
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law is a group, established
in 1985, comprised of "leaders in the fields of law, medicine, nursing,
philosophy and bioethics, as well as patient advocates and representatives of
diverse religious communities." The Task Force is chaired by the "New York
State Commissioner of Health." See Task Force on the Life and the Law - Fact
185

Sheet,

available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/taskfce/factsht.htm

(last visited Feb. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
186 Executive Summary of the Task Force on Life and the Law (April 1998),
available at http://www.health.state.nv.us/nysdoh/taskfce/execsum.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Task Force]. This is a summary of the 424
page full report.
187 See infra Part VIII (a) (i).
188 Task Force, supra note 183.
189
Id.

190 See Fact Sheet, supra note 182.
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posthumously conceived children to qualify as heirs of their
deceased parent.
CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The New York Surrogate's Court, like other courts in New
York State, has an Advisory Committee ("Committee"), that works
towards clarifying law in the trust and estate area. In January of
2005, the Committee issued its report, containing proposed
legislation to two laws (amongst others) that are relevant for this
paper.
CLARIFICATION OF THE "AFTER-BORN CHILD"
CURRENT LAW

Section 5-3.2 of the EPTL sets out an after-born child's
right in New York when a will has been left by the decedent. The
statute states that when, at the time the will is executed, the testator
has at least one living child and fails to provide for any after-born
children in the will, "an after-born child is not entitled to share in
the testator's estate."''
The following section goes on to detail
how the shares are to be distributed when the will does provide for
after-born children. 9 2 If the testator has left a will, and had no
other living children at the time of the will's execution, an afterborn child is entitled to "the portion of such testator's estate 93as
would have passed to such child had the testator died intestate."'
PROPOSED LAW

The Committee's Report ("Report") recommends an
addition to section 5-3.2, in order to clarify that the term "afterborn" means "only children born after the execution of a last will
during the life of the testator, or a child in gestation at the time of

191
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (a) (1) (A) (McKinney 2005).
192 §5-3.2 (a) (1) (B).

193§5-3.2 (a) (2).
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the testator's death who is born after the testator's death."' 19 4 This
proposal is based on the New York State Task on Life and the
Law's recommendation that where an individual dies prior to an
embryo, created from the individual's egg or sperm, is implanted,
that individual will not be deemed the parent of any child born
from the embryo.' 95 The Report goes on to state that this "measure
would avoid the possibility that a child born many years after the
death of the testator, without the testator's desire and knowledge,
'
will claim a share of the estate pursuant to EPTL 5-3.2. ' I96
According to the Report, allowing such posthumously conceived
children to take under section 5-3.2 would "unfairly deprive" the
testator's already living children and would allow a child that the
testator would not have desired or foreseen, and "with whom the
testator had no relationship" to take a share of the estate.' 97
Furthermore, the Report notes that if a testator "anticipates the
possibility of having a posthumous child," he or she "could readily
create a trust for such child under his or her last will.'

198

By

adopting such legislation, the Report reasons that the State could
avoid the undue complication of the administration of estates that
would occur by allowing posthumous children to take under
section 5-3.29
Although this proposed legislation deals with the effect of
after-born children on will provisions, it could easily be carried
over into the area of intestacy law. Significantly, the Report
indicates how New York is preparing to deal with posthumously
conceived children in the area of trusts and estates, and it seems as
though the Task Force's recommendations are being considered
most heavily.
Report of the Surrogate's Court Advisory Committee to the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Courts of the State of New York, available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/iudiciarvlegislative/SurrogatesCourtAd 05.pdf
(last visited March 19, 2005) [hereinafter Report].
195 See Report, supra note 191 (citing the Task Force's recommendations. See
Task Force, supra note 182).
194

196 Id.
197 id.
198 id.
199 Id.
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CHILDREN BORN USING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
TO MARRIED COUPLES

CURRENT LAW

New York DRL § 73, as previously discussed, determines
the legitimacy of children born through artificial insemination.00
Also noted was the fact that this statute deals only with artificial
insemination, and does not address any other ARTs. This is the
exact issue addressed by the proposed legislation.
PROPOSED LAW

The Committee first points out that the current section 73
only provides for children born of artificial insemination, and
recommends that this section "be amended to extend such
recognition to children who are born to married couples by more
advanced means of assisted reproduction. °1
Based on the
advances in medical technology, artificial insemination is only one
method by which infertile couples may choose to attempt to have a
child, the Committee deems it necessary to amend section 73 to
"include children born by any method of assisted reproduction now
in use or developed in the future, so that these children will be
deemed the legitimate, natural children of the wife and her
consenting husband, regardless of whether their own or donated
gametes or embryos are used."20 2 Once again, the Committee
looked to the Task Force's recommendations and adopted those
recommendations when proposing this legislation.
This proposal certainly indicates a possible trend of
increased tolerance in New York regarding ARTs, which is a
positive step. However, there is no indication that this slight
increase in tolerance would assist posthumously conceived
children gain any rights in terms of intestacy, or other trust and
estate, law. In fact, the proposed legislation to section 5-3.2
indicates the opposite.
See supra text related to notes 176-80.
201 Report, supranote 191.
200

202

.
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WILLS

The use of a will to provide for posthumously conceived
children, as opposed to relying on intestacy statutes, would most
definitely establish the property rights of any resulting
posthumously conceived child.2 °3 In particular, if a will were to
devise an express gift to "my posthumously conceived children,"
the testator's wishes would most likely be respected, and that gift
should be allowed. 2°4 This theory is consistent with both the
Surrogate's Court Report, which states that an individual should
create a trust in his or her will to provide for posthumous children,
and the American Law Institute and other organizational
approaches, which provide that so long as an individual consents in
writing to the use of his or her gametes after his or her death, that
consent will be used to provide from the testator's estate for such
children. °5
In at least one case, an individual placed a provision in his
will stating that his frozen sperm should be released to his
girlfriend for use after his death.20 6 Although the deceased man's
two adult children contested this provision, and wanted to have the
frozen sperm destroyed, the court held that the "decedent had an
interest, in the nature of ownership '2 7 in his sperm, and thus the
sperm was "properly part of the decedent's estate., 20 ' The holding
of this case suggests that a provision providing for the posthumous
use of gametes, and any provision providing for the support of any
resulting child or children, could be upheld.
But the concept of using a will to allow for posthumous
conception or to provide for any resulting children could be
203

In fact, a Florida statute specifically states that a posthumously conceived

child "shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the
child has been provided for by the decedent's will." FLA. STAT. ANN..§ 742.17
(West 2005).
204 See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 110 (discussing that "[w]here the testator has
expressly included PMC children in his will, the estate should stay open in case
such children are born.").
205 See supra Parts VII and VIII.
206 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (1993).
201 Id. at 281.
208 Id. at 283.
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problematic. Specifically, what if there is a will but no mention of
posthumously conceived children? 29 If that were to occur, it
would probably leave any resulting posthumously conceived
children with no rights at all, especially in New York.21 °
Ultimately, unless a will explicitly states that posthumously
conceived children are entitled to a particular share of the
decedent's estate, the will would not be of much assistance to
posthumously conceived children.
WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ALLOW POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN TO TAKE AS INTESTATE HEIRS

There are many policy reasons why New York should
allow posthumously conceived children to be considered heirs of a
deceased parent for purposes of intestacy law. First, since children
cannot control the circumstances surrounding their births, it is
unfair to deny them an intestate share of a deceased parent's estate
based solely on those circumstances. Additionally, stigmatizing a
child in such a manner, and singling the child out from the rest of
the family by disallowing the child to take as an heir, immediately
alienates the child from the rest of the family upon birth.
Furthermore, there is the possibility that if the child is not allowed
to take an intestate share of his or her deceased parent's estate, the
child has an increased likelihood of becoming a ward of the State.

209

See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 11 1-13 for a discussion about the different

scenarios that could arise concerning posthumously conceived children and the
use of a will. There could also be problems relating to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Specifically, if a deceased parent is entitled to any type of
inheritance through his or her relatives, a posthumously conceived child of that
deceased parent could violate the Rule. See id. at 113-14, discussing the issues
that can arise concerning the Rule Against Perpetuities.
210 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2(a)(l)(A), stating that if, at the
time the will is written, the testator has at least one child, and does not make a
provision in the will for an after-born child, any resulting after-born child will
not be entitled to a share of the testator's estate.
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INNOCENT VICTIMS

Children do not control the circumstances surrounding their
births. Holding a child responsible for those circumstances by
denying a biological child's intestacy rights based solely on the
fact that the child's birth does not fit into a particular legal timeframe is unfair. Children are the innocent victims of circumstance,
and punishing them because of their parents' choice of when and
how to conceive is against public policy. Whether or not the State
agrees with an individual's decision to conceive using a deceased
spouse's gametes should not be a factor in determining a child's
intestacy rights-the legislature was not created to pass moral
judgments, but to provide laws that will best-suit the residents of
the State. Passing a law that allows posthumously conceived
children to take as intestate heirs from their deceased parents
would be in the best interests of the citizens of New York State,
especially the children.
ALIENATION FROM THE REST OF THE FAMILY

Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Gamete already had one child when
Mr. Gamete is killed at war, and after his death Mrs. Gamete
chooses to conceive another child using Mr. Gamete's frozen
sperm. Under current New York law Gamete Jr., conceived prior
to Mr. Gamete's death, would be entitled to an intestate share of
his father's estate, but Gamete II would not. In fact, immediately
upon birth Gamete II would be treated differently in the law from
his older brother, which would stigmatize and alienate him from
the rest of the family.211 Although Gamete Jr.'s share of his
father's estate would have to be reduced in order to accommodate
Gamete II, allowing Gamete II to take an intestate share of his
deceased father's estate would provide equality between the
brothers in the Gamete home. Gamete II would not be made to
feel inferior or less special than Gamete Jr., and this would
promote family harmony. Since New York has always had a
211 As pointed out by the attorney for Ms. Kolacy (from In Re Estate of Kolacy),

"[i]t is illogical to assume that a decedent would desire to prevent a biological
child from sharing in the estate." Kerekes, supra note 118, at 240.
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strong focus on the best interests of the child, 1 2 allowing Gamete
II, and other posthumously conceived children to take an intestate
share in a deceased father's estate would promote those interests.
WARDS OF THE STATE

Another policy weighing in favor of allowing
posthumously conceived children to take as heirs of their deceased
parent is to prevent such children from becoming wards of the
State. Even if the decedent did not have much money or other
valuable assets that could be passed through intestacy to
posthumously conceived children, the decedent's parents or other
relatives may be quite wealthy.
Thus, in the Gamete family example, suppose Mr. and Mrs.
Gamete had very little income, little or no savings and no life
insurance policies. When Mr. Gamete died, Mrs. Gamete, under
EPTL § 4-1.1 would be entitled to his entire estate (assuming they
did not have any children at the time of his death). Six months
after Mr. Gamete's death, Mrs. Gamete becomes pregnant using
Mr. Gamete's frozen sperm, and simultaneously Mr. Gamete's
father, Gamete Sr., is told he only has a year to live. Gamete Sr. is
a very wealthy man, and a widower, and Mr. Gamete was Gamete
Sr.'s only child. If the child born to Mrs. Gamete is considered
Mr. Gamete's heir for intestacy purposes, the child would also be
eligible to take an intestate share of Gamete Sr.'s estate. If on the
other hand the child is not considered Mr. Gamete's heir, he will
not be entitled to any of Gamete Sr.'s estate (unless Gamete Sr.
provided for such child via a will). Again, Mrs. Gamete has very
little money, and by not allowing the child to be considered an heir

22

See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988) ("the court shall

determine solely what is for the best interest of the child, what will best promote
its welfare and happiness"); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 172 (1982)
(holding that "in adjudicating custody and visitation rights, the most important
consideration for the court is the best interests of the children"; and In Re
Adoption ofAnonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435 (Surr. Ct. 1973) (which case, in
the context of artificial insemination, stated that "our liberal policy is for the
protection of the child").
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of Mr. Gamete, the child may be forced to seek assistance from the
State.
Although this scenario may seem far-fetched, it is a
distinct possibility. In a situation where only one parent is alive to
provide for a child, financial difficulties are bound to arise, and not
infrequently. Allowing posthumously conceived children to be
considered an heir of his or her deceased parent opens up that
entire family lineage to the child-being an heir for one person
means being an heir for the whole family. Moreover, the State
would not incur any costs by allowing such children to take as
intestate heirs-there would still be only one decedent, and one
estate to administer 2 3-and it could end up saving the State a lot of
money by not having to provide public assistance.
How NEW YORK COULD ALLOW POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN TO TAKE AS INTESTATE HEIRS

In order to allow posthumously conceived children to take
as intestate heirs of a deceased parent, it is necessary to set certain
parameters. Discussed below are the most important parameters
that need to be addressed.
LOGISTICS

Regarding New York intestacy law, there are a number of
logistical issues that need to be resolved. Such issues include
immediacy (from the time of the decedent's death until the
decision is made to use the deceased's frozen gametes), the intent
of the decedent (needing to ascertain that intent), timing (how long
after the death of a decedent may a child be born and be considered
an heir), limitations (i.e., limiting use to the surviving spouse) and
testing (DNA or blood) to establish paternity or maternity.

213

Of course, the administration of the estate may be prolonged by a

posthumously conceived child, but there are ways to resolve that problem. See
infra Part XIII(v).
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IMMEDIACY

The purpose of the intestacy statute is to provide a quick
and efficient method by which to close an estate when a decedent
has not left a will, or has not disposed of all of his or her property
by will. 214 As previously discussed, children can be posthumously
conceived many years after the death of a biological parent, which
could result in an estate being held open indefinitely. In order to
avoid this, a number of measures must be taken, the first of which
is "immediacy." What is meant by immediacy in this context is
that a surviving spouse would be required to declare his or her
intent to use the decedent's frozen gametes to conceive
immediately upon the decedent's death. The legislature would
have to determine exactly what "immediate" would be-although a
day or week may be too immediate, two or three months may be
reasonable.
The idea behind immediacy is to inform the
surrogate's court, other potential heirs, 215' and the administrator of
the estate (assuming that the surviving spouse was not the
administrator) of the likelihood of other possible heirs. As will be
discussed, there are measures that can be taken at that time to close
the estate but still provide for any resulting child or children.
The advantage to the "immediacy" rule is that the intestacy
rights of a posthumously conceived child can start to be
established. Also, the estate will be closed, which is in the best
interests of the State and the surviving heirs. The negative side to
this rule is that it forces an individual who is grieving to make a
life-altering decision shortly after losing his or her spouse. Of
course, the surviving spouse could always declare his or her intent
to use the gametes, thus preserving that option, but then never do
so. Overall, this is probably the simplest way to start the
posthumous conception process while minimally interfering with
current law.

NY Legislative History.
Unless the decedent already had a child or children at the time of death, the
only surviving heir in New York would be the surviving spouse. See N.Y. EST.
214
215

POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §4-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
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INTENT OF DECEDENT

Once immediacy has been established, then the intent of the
decedent must be determined. If the decedent filled out a consent
form at the time his or her gametes were deposited, 1 6 such intent
should be easily ascertained. However, not all posthumously
conceived children are conceived using the frozen gametes of an
individual who intended them for such use. In particular, there
have been instances in which, within hours after the death of
loved-one (husband, son), the decedent's sperm was retrieved and
21 7
later used (this is known as "posthumous sperm procurement").
Intent in this situation would not be as clear. Posthumous sperm
procurement raises a number of additional legal issues, which are
beyond the scope of this discussion, and the legislature would be
well-advised to address those issues as well.
The intent of the decedent is "[a]rguably the most
important issue involving postmortem insemination."2 8 First,
there are constitutional issues surrounding the use of an
individual's frozen gametes without their consent, and those issues
do not just disappear upon death.2 19 Second, intent becomes
important because, when looking to other states that have
addressed this issue and the ALI, one common denominator
amongst these rules is that the decedent must not have only
intended posthumous conception, he or she must also have

See infra Part XlII(b) (ii) discussing consent forms.
For a discussion on posthumous sperm procurement, see Joshua M. Hurwitz,
MD and Frances R. Batzer, MD, A Guest Editorial: Posthumous Sperm
Procurement: Demand and Concerns, 59 OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL
SURVEY, SOUNDINGS, Number 12, 806, 806 (2004).
218 Gilbert, supra note 3, at 550.
219 "Since the sperm donor is now deceased, it is not the decedent's right to
216

217

procreate that is affected, but his interest in making reproductive decisions while
he is alive for a time when he will no longer be living. Thus, the question
becomes whether such an interest 'should be granted the high respect ordinarily
granted to core reproductive experiences when conflicts with the interests of
others arise,' thereby creating a fundamental right to make such decisions."
Gilbert, supra note 3. at 551-52.
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intended to support any resulting child.220 New York should
determine if that particular requirement would need to be met as
well; this could be resolved by the use of a consent form.22 '
TIMING

Another important parameter that needs to be set is timing:
How long after the death of a decedent can a posthumously
conceived child be considered an heir? Here, the state must weigh
the relative rights of the potential children against the State's
interest in having complete and final closure of the estate (the
estate would be closed, but there may be a trust or bank account
established for posthumous children that would need to be closed).
The cases, state legislatures and the ALl have determined that the
child (or children) must be born within two to three years after the
decedent's death.222 This amount of time seems fair, but the
legislature would have to make the final determination.
The main advantage to having a time limit is final
closure--once that time limit has expired, the possibility of
considering a posthumously conceived child an heir is eliminated.
The primary disadvantage is the fact that any time limit may be
difficult to meet because it may not give a surviving spouse
enough time to grieve, conceive, and then actually give birth. This
fact becomes even more complicated when a surrogate mother is
needed (when the decedent is a woman). Of course, in order to
create a proper balance between the surviving spouse and the State,
some time limit is appropriate.

See Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 259
(2002) (stating that "[t]he survivor or representative must then establish both
that the decedent affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and to the
220

support of any resulting child"); and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§2.5, cmt. 1 (1999) (stating that a surviving

spouse would have to prove that the "decedent would have approved of the

child's right to inherit").

221 See infra Part XIII(b)(ii), discussing the use of consent forms.
222 See supra notes 78-79, 105, 124 and 133. There have also been suggestions

that it should be a "reasonable time." See the ALI approach, supra note 105.
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LIMITATION TO SURVIVING SPOUSE223

In the area of posthumous conception, establishing a
posthumously conceived child's rights is already sufficiently
complicated. Allowing individuals other than the decedent's
spouse to use a decedent's frozen gametes can complicate matters
exponentially. Except in the situation where a surrogate mother is
used, and that of course would only be to facilitate a deceased
husband's own use, no one other than a surviving spouse should be
allowed to use the decedent's gametes. Again, this limitation is
necessary in order to avoid additional complications in this already
complicated area.
TRUSTS

The simplest, most efficient way to provide for
posthumously conceived children in the area of intestacy law is
through the use of a trust. 2 4 After a surviving spouse has
immediately declared his or her intent to use the frozen gametes of
his or her deceased spouse, a trust should be created for the benefit
of posthumously conceived children at that time. The trust could
be funded by using a portion of the decedent's intestate estate. For
example, under New York intestacy law, a surviving spouse is
entitled to the first fifty-thousand dollars of the estate, and one half
of the remainder. 225 That amount could be distributed to the
surviving spouse by the surrogate court virtually immediately after
the death of the decedent. The other half of the estate could be put
into a trust for the benefit of posthumously conceived children, if
there were no other children of the decedent at that time. If there
were other children, then the "posthumous fund" would be the
proportional share of the remainder that one child would be
223

If, in the future, New York allows either civil unions or same-sex marriages,

the legislature should allow the surviving partner or spouse in those situations to
be included within this limitation.
224 Gary, infra note 237, at 38. Other devices, such as the posting
of a bond by
the beneficiaries, a bank account, or the use of a guardianship account could
work as well. Since trusts are inherently flexible instruments, using them keeps
the
distribution process relatively simple.
225
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1.
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entitled to receive (if there were already two children, each child
would get a third of the remainder, and the trust would get the
other third).
The trust would expire according to the statutory limit for
conceiving such children. If posthumous children were never
conceived, the trust would merely expire, and the amount in the
trust would be distributed as though the fund never even existed (if
there were no other children, the surviving spouse would get the
funds; if there were other children, they would split the fund
amongst themselves proportionally-in the example given, the
children would split the fund in half).
If more than one
posthumous child was conceived, the trust would have to be split
amongst them-everyone who already received their share would
not be required to relinquish some of that money in order to
equalize the distribution. Although other methods may be used,
such as establishing a bank account, the trust is the most flexible,
easiest way to accommodate posthumously conceived children
while also protecting other heirs' rights.
DNA (OR BLOOD) TESTING
The final important area that must be addressed is a
requirement for DNA or blood testing. In an ideal world, mistakes
and deceit would not exist. Unfortunately, people, including
fertility clinics, make mistakes.226 The legislature would have to
determine how to deal with a situation in which a surviving spouse
was given the wrong gametes to use (meaning, not the deceased
spouse's gametes). It would seem unfair for a child to be excluded
as an heir when the intent of the decedent and the surviving spouse

226

See Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 19 (1st Dept. 2000). This is a

case in which an IVF clinic mistakenly implanted a woman with embryos made
up of her and her husband's embryos and the embryos of another couple. The
woman gave birth to two boys---one was white, which was the woman and her
husband's biological child; the other child was black, and upon testing it was
determined that that child was the biological child of the other couple.
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was to conceive a biological child of their own, which did not
occur through fault of another, but that is a possibility.227
In rare situations, an individual may claim that a child is the
posthumous child of a decedent, when in fact it is not. For
example, a woman may have intercourse with someone else around
the same time that she is attempting to be artificially inseminated
with her deceased husband's sperm. She may claim that a child
who is born is the child of the decedent, but the child is not. Or, a
man may find a surrogate to be implanted with embryos created
from his and his wife's gametes, and unbeknownst to him, an IVF
procedure did not work. Around the same time that the intended
surrogate goes through the IVF procedure, the surviving husband
begins having intercourse with the surrogate. When she gives
birth, the child is not the child of the deceased wife. Although the
occasion in which one of these situations would occur is rare, it is a
possibility, and must be provided for.
As discussed, New York has a strong policy against
exhuming a body in order to administer a blood test.228 But, like
the situation with non-marital children,229 requiring posthumously
conceived children to prove their paternity and maternity is not
unreasonable.23° One way this could be accomplished would be to
require all individuals who are depositing gametes to also deposit a
blood sample that can later be used for genetic testing purposes. If
courts were willing to accept blood samples from other family
Or, if any gametes
members, that should also be sufficient.'

227

Both the child and the mother would most likely have a cause of action

against the clinic in error.
228 See supra text accompanying notes 170-75.
229

See supra text accompanying notes 58; 158-75 and 57-59, discussing burdens

placed on non-marital children in order to prove paternity and comparing
P3osthumously

conceived children to non-marital children, respectively.

0 This is consistent with some of the other states that have addressed this issue.

See Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (2002)

(requiring posthumously conceived children to establish a genetic relationship);
In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. 2000) (must determine that a
posthumously conceived "child is indeed the offspring of a decedent").
3

Assuming, of course, that the family members of the decedent would

willingly do so.
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remain frozen at the time of conception, some of those gametes
may be used for testing purposes.
Problems could arise if none of these means for testing
could be met (due to mistake or lack of cooperation). The
legislature should set up alternative means by which testing can be
accomplished if all three of the above-mentioned methods fail.
REGULATION OF FERTILITY CLINICS

New York, like the majority of states in this country, has
little or no regulation regarding fertility clinics.232 Currently, there
is no law that states whether or not an individual is allowed or not
allowed to take the frozen gametes of a decedent and use them to
conceive a child. This is clearly problematic: there is nothing in
the law preventing such use, but simultaneously there is virtually
no law dealing with many of the rights resulting posthumously
conceived children will or will not have upon birth.
RELATED LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ISSUES

Two other areas of law that New York should consider
regulating, both related to ART, are the regulation of fertility
clinics and the consent forms used by the fertility clinics.
FERTILITY CLINICS

New York, like most states, lacks the proper regulation of
its fertility clinics. Some of the issues that need to be regulated, in
terms of posthumously conceived children, are as follows. (1)
Disclosure. Rules need to be developed that require disclosing to a
patient that if he or she chooses to use the frozen gametes of a
deceased spouse, the resulting child's (or children's) rights are
currently unclear.233 (2) Use. New York needs to decide whether
232

See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of

UnregulatedBiomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603 (2003) (discussing the
lack of regulation in the fertility industry).
233 Currently, clinics do address some ethical issues, such as the "moral status of
embryos," but that alone is insufficient.

See Albany IVF Fertility and

Gynecology, Statement and Policy on Ethics Related to Assisted Reproduction,

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL.

Vol. XIV

or not it is legal in New York for a fertility clinic to allow the
posthumous use of frozen gametes (in terms of known donors only.
Anonymous donors relinquish all parental rights upon depositing
their gametes). Until posthumously conceived children's rights are
established in New York, perhaps a fertility clinic should not be
allowed to release a spouse's frozen gametes to a surviving spouse
when the deceased spouse has not left a will providing for a
resulting child. (3) Timing. If the issue of use is resolved, and the
legislature allows posthumous use of a decedent's gametes, the
legislature then needs to determine the appropriate amount of time
after the decedent's death that the gametes can be used.234 (4) To
whom specimens are to be released. When an individual dies with
frozen gametes, who should be allowed to take and/or use those
gametes? Rules need to be established regarding who should be
able to take and/or use these specimens after the death of the
individual who deposited them (i.e., New York could limit use to a
spouse, other family members or perhaps require that such
specimens be either donated to an anonymous individual or
destroyed upon death). What should also be determined is whether
to abide by the testator's intent (via will or other written
instrument) or whether a rule should be established that does not
consider the testator's intent.
Although the legislature cannot plan for every and all
circumstances that are bound to arise in the area of posthumous
conception and fertility clinics, it is in the best position to establish
a set of guidelines that the clinics, the public and the courts can
follow moving forward.

available at http://www.albanyivf.com/PDFs/Ethics%20Statement.pdf

(last

visited March 20, 2005).
234 This is to be distinguished from the timing issue regarding intestacy rights of
posthumously conceived children, discussed in Part XIII (a)(iii), supra. With
the timing for purposes of intestacy law, it limits the amount of time, after the
death of a decedent that a posthumously conceived child will be eligible to
qualify as an heir. With the timing issue surrounding use, this is to limit liability
for the fertility clinic itself in terms of keeping the specimens for an unduly
burdensome period of time and any health risks involved to the individual
wanting to use the specimens when using specimens beyond a certain amount of
time after they have been frozen.
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CONSENT FORMS

Another important area of legislation to be addressed,
related to the first area, is the regulation of consent forms. Such
forms are used by fertility clinics at, or just prior to, the time at
which an individual is depositing gametes first to establish that
both parties who are participating in any procedure are both
consenting to such procedure. Consent forms are also used to
notify the parties of any risks that are involved in the procedures
that they are about to undergo,235 determine what is to happen to
any frozen embryos or pre-embryos in the event of divorce,
separation or death of the parties,236 and to provide options if a
couple or individual no longer wishes for the gametes to remain
frozen.2 37

For purposes of this discussion, the focus must be on what
is to occur upon the death of either (or both) party (or parties).
Currently, this is only vaguely addressed in such forms.23 8 But,
these forms must be changed in order to specifically address how
an individual (or, in the case of an embryo, both parties) wishes to
proceed in the event of his or her death. First, there should be a
number of questions that should be statutorily required to be asked
235

Risks may result in multiple pregnancy, low birth weight of child, birth

defects.
There are also risks associated with hormone injections, and
"intracytoplasmic sperm injection" ("[i]n this procedure, one sperm is injected
into each oocyte."). See Albany IVF Fertility and Gynecology, Consent Form
at
Fertilization-Embryo
Transfer,
available
for
In
Vitro
httn://www.albanyivf.com/PDFs/IVF%20Consent2004.pdf (last visited March
20, 2005) [hereinafter Consent Form].
236 Id. Parties are asked to notify the clinic in the event of death of one of either
party or if the parties divorce or separate. The parties also must "agree to
discuss the status of [their] pre-embryos/embryos with [their] respective divorce
attorneys as part of [their] formal divorce proceedings." Id.
237 Couples can either have the embryos destroyed, transferred to an embryo
adoption agency or transferred to a research facility. Id.
238 Based on the Albany IVF Consent Form found on their website, a couple
desiring to undergo IVF, using both parties' gametes, merely must agree that
"[i]n the event of death of either party ... the sole responsibility and decisionmaking for our pre-embryos/embryos goes to the undersigned surviving genetic
parent." This gives sole discretion to the surviving party, with no regulation
whatsoever. Id.
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to individuals, prior to the time when they are to deposit their
gametes. Such questions should not have merely a "yes" or "no"
answer, but should require an individual to clearly define his or her
wishes. The questions should include at least the following. (1)
What should be done with your gametes upon your death? (2) Do
you authorize your spouse 239 to use your gametes after your death
to conceive a child? Why or why not? (3) Do you have a will? If
so, does it include a provision for any children that may be born
after your death? If not, do you intend on having a will created
that will include a provision for any children that may be born after
your death, or do you otherwise intend to financially support any
children born after your death? 240 (4) For how long after
your
241
death do you authorize posthumous use of your gametes?
After full disclosure from the clinic (as previously
discussed), a party should understand the implications of their
answers to the questions being asked, and should answer such
questions accordingly. Again, even with full disclosure and a
perfect consent form, problems are bound to arise. But, setting at
least minimal standards will avoid a majority of likely problems.
CONCLUSION

Posthumous conception has been a reality in the United
States for over a decade, and legislatures throughout the country
239

In order to avoid more confusion, I have deliberately left out "partners" and

other family members. If an individual depositing gametes wishes to allow a
partner or family member use his or her gametes after his or her death, that
individual would need to create a will for that purpose. See discussion on
"Limitation to Surviving Spouse," supra.
240 The will is almost a guaranteed way to avoid the problems with intestacy
laws, subject to some limitations (see wills discussion, supra Part XI). As noted
by one author, "the possibility of posthumous conception or the existence of
frozen embryos at death should be considered at the drafting stage.. .A client
who has stored or plans to store genetic material should address the question of
posthumous conception specifically in his or her will.". Susan N. Gary,
Posthumously Conceived Heirs: Where the Law Stands and What to Do About It
Now, 19 PROB. & PROP. 32, 37 (March/April 2005).
241

The maximum amount of time should be established by statute, but this

question gives the depositor the option of limiting the time to less than the

statutory amount. See discussion on timing, supra Part XIII(a)(iii).
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should start addressing how their respective states plan on dealing
with this issue when it arises. Ideally, all 50 states will recognize
the intestacy rights of posthumously conceived children, but that is
unlikely. Instead, states should at least clearly define what rights,
or lack of rights, such children will have upon birth.
When a surviving spouse of a decedent decides to use the
decedent's frozen gametes to conceive a child, he or she does so
for a number of reasons. For example, conceiving a child of a
deceased loved one may help the widow or widower with the
grieving process, may enable the parent(s) of a deceased child to
become a grandparent, and may be the only opportunity the
surviving spouse has to become a parent.242 Undoubtedly, the
decision to become the parent of a posthumously conceived child
is made with the best intentions. Although some will argue that
posthumously conceived children should not be entitled to
intestacy rights through their deceased parent, looking to the
broader concept of the best interest of the child, and the love with
which such children are conceived, dictates a different result.
Current New York law indicates that New York would be
opposed to allowing posthumously conceived children to take an
intestate share of his or her deceased parent's estate. Based on
New York's history of protecting the best interest of the child, and
promoting a strong family unit, this would not be consistent with
New York policy. The legislature should instead pass legislation
entitling posthumously conceived children to a portion of a
deceased parent's intestate estate, which can be accomplished
through the use of a trust.
Of course, many parameters would need to be set
surrounding the intestate distribution of deceased parent's estate
such as time limits, limitations regarding surviving spouses, and
blood tests. Also, careful attention must be paid to the intent of the
decedent, first regarding the intent to posthumous conception, and
also possibly determining the decedent's intent to provide for any
posthumously conceived children. These parameters, along with
others deemed necessary by the legislature, should be clearly
242

If the surviving spouse is in his or her late 30s or 40s, there may not be

enough time to grieve, fall in love again (if ever), remarry and then have a child.
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So long as this is accomplished, posthumously
established.
conceived children will be provided for in the most equitable
manner possible, without disrupting the rights of other surviving
heirs.

